One of the earliest tactical lessons learned by mankind on the field of battle was that the greater be the distance from which one could strike at one's enemy, the greater the degree of flexibility one could achieve in field maneuvers. Thus, even in the days of the the Greek phalanx on the Roman legion, when armies faced each other in parallel order in single lines of ordered masses varying in depth and engaged in close-quarter combat there was always an attempt to gain initial tactical advantage by the early commitment of the auxiliaries - the archers, slingers and darters -who, in fact, num-manual projectiles, however, were not sufficient decisive to have a marked effect on the mass tactics of those days.

Even after mechanical projectiles were invented and used in battle-the Balista, the catapult, the trebuchet, the cross-bow-the tactics of massed confrontation continued to be the main pursuit of commanders for a long time to come. There was only one great and that was the growing use of the engines of war (both projectile and engineer contrivances) in siege operations. During this classic age investment was regarded as the main purpose of warfare.

Although the gun made its first appearance on the battlefields of Europe in the fourteenth century, the gustatory period of artillery was long and its development slow. The gun gradually came to replace the engines of war, but it look nearly four centuries before artillery tactics as we know it began to emerge from the tactics of medieval siege craft.

The first man to appreciate the correct role of artillery in battle was the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus. He realised the importance of mobile artillery-and invented the first light field piece-weighing 650 lbs and shot, so light mounted that two men could handle it in battle. This was a momentous achievement, because it is from the mobile use of the light field piece that artillery tactics as we understand it today eventually emerged- though it took nearly two more centuries before the fullest tactical use could be made of artillery on the battlefield. It is to Napoleon that we owe the modern concept of the artillery in battle.

It is difficult to pinpoint the first use of artillery in the Orient because of imprecise historical records. According to Trevanier, gunpowder was first discovered in Assam in ancient times. From there it travelled by way of Burma to the Far East and from there, eventually, to the west. The "gun" in those early days consisted of a metal pipe or nalika two and a half cubits in length, with a hole in the rear through which the charge was ignited. The missiles were usually stones and, later, even metal balls. This knowledge of the use of gunpowder for battle seems to have been forgotten during later centuries for we find no record of the employment of artillery until the second half of the fourteenth century.

Although the Moghul Emperor Babur is popularly credited with the introduction of the artillery in land warfare in India, evidence is now available that it was the Bahmani Kings who first used artillery-in the Deccan in their wars against the Vijaynagar kingdom. The persian historian Ferishtah (who served in the armies of the rulers of both Ahmednagar and Bijapur during the sixteenth century) records that the battle of Adoni in 1368, Mohammed shah Bahmani I had collected a train of artillery ( he used the Protuguese word tope)- the guns being served by Persians, Abyssinians and Arabs, Truks and Europeans being attached to the trains as advisers. The tactics was to open battle with a cannonade, which disrupted the formation of the Vijayanagar troops, followed by the coup de grace of a cavalry charge.

This evidence of the use of artillery by the Bahmani kings is not accepted by all historians, but there is no doubt that by the end of fifteen century, King Mohammed Shah of Gujarat was using artillery both as naval guns and for siege craft in land operations. Then came the Portuguese, who for the first time introduced the man -o'-war armed with cannon- and introduced the concept of "command of the seas" to Indian Ocean strategy. By the early sixteen century, Zamorin, ruler of Calicut, had begun to emulate the Protuguese and to arm his ships with naval pieces.

It was the early contact with Europeans -based on Surat- or with the Persian and Arab lands across the Arabian sea that was the main reason for the first appearance of the gun in Central and South India. North India remained innocent of the use of this arm for nearly a Century and half longer.

Moghul Artillery

It Was the first battle of Panipat, 1526, that the Moghul Emperor Babur first used the artillery in North India - when he decisively defeated Ibrahim Lodi, the Afghan kings of Delhi. The main cause of the latter's defeat was effective use of artillery'" estimated to be nearly 300 guns, manned by Rumi and persian gunners who had learned the art from Osmali gunners. Lodi's forces were estimated by Babur to be about 100,000-including infantry, cavalry and about a thousand armoured elephants, but containing no artillery.

Babur's fire- arms in the battle consisted of hand -guns and light guns resting on wooden falconets. He had no mortars because their carriage was heavy and " required four to five hundred men to haul"( Later, however, some mortars were cast by his Persian ordnance chief at Agra and used in the battle of Kanwaha in 1527). 

At Panipat, Babur's forces were deployed in five divisions namely, vanguard, right wing, left wing, center and rear guard. Besides, there were two flanking parties for making taughama that is, going around the enemy's flanks and attacking his rear; and two small but mobile bodies of easily dispensable reserves called It Mish. The vanguard or " park of artillery " was deployed in the front along with matchlock men in support. It was commanded by two expert gunners- the right wing under Ustad Ali and the left under Mustafa. To provide adequate protection to musketeers and artillery - men, 700 baggage carts was formed up in front, the wheels of every two being tied together with twisted bull-hides in Turkish fashion. Between every two carts (about 16 yards) five or six shields (called mantles) on wooden tripods were set up behind which matchlock men were to stand and fire. At the regular intervals gaps were left for the small cavalry parties to advance though and charge

Babur's main plan during the battle was to roll the Afghan wings on to the centre and thus create a worth- while target for his artillery men who "could inflict deadly blows if faced with a concentrated target." He wanted to hold the enemy mass in front and then deal a mortal blow to it. So, while the enemy advanced towards the front-line, Babur's enveloping troops (cavalry) out-flanked the Afghans from the sides and attacked the enemy's rear. Simultaneously, the left and the right wings engaged the enemy from close quarters. Surrounded from all sides and hard-pressed the Afghan wings rolled on to the front. "And now Babur's gunners Ustad Ali and Mustafa engaged the lucrative target with their guns; Afghans fighting valiantly fell in their thousands." As described by Lane Poole, "The master gunner, Ustad Ali, made pretty practise with his firangi pieces, infront of the line and was admirably seconded by Mustafa, the cannoneer on the left centre." Frightened by gun-fire, Lodi's elephants turned and went through their own troops trampling and causing confusion. Thus, by means of his superior tactics and an effective combination of his highly trained cavalry and the new artillery arm Babur was able to wipe out the numerical superiority of his adversary whose mighty army "in the space of half a day was laid in dust."

Next came the battle of Kanwaha (Khanwa) fought between Babur and Rana Sanga of Chittor on 16th March 1527, in which once again the strong artillery fire coupled with superior tactics and efficient cavalry charges won victory for the Mughals. To face an adversary far superior in numbers Babur had to rely on his mortars and matchlocks. Babur deployed his forces in the same manner as in Panipat, that is the baggage carts (700 at Panipat, probably 1000 at Kanwaha) tied together in Turkish fashion and arranged in front, five or six shields fixed to wheeled tripods and placed between every two carts and space left at regular intervals for horsemen to sally forth. Behind the carts were the mortars, falconets, and foot-musketeers. Ustad Ali was posted in front of the centre with the mortars and other wheeled guns (called JinsiTopkhana by the Mughals) while his colleague Mustafa Khan stood apart from him in front of the centre of the right wing with his musketeers and swivel guns (Zamburak) or the DastiTopkhana. Babur's plan at the battle of Kanwaha was to reduce the numerical superiority of the Rajput assailants through his defensive matchlock fire and stone -hurling mortars, and to take to the offensive when the enemy's strength was decimated and worn out. The battle opened by the Rajputs attacking Babur's right wing. Bodies of reserve were rushed to its assistance, when Mustafa Rumi, who commanded one portion of the artillery (and matchlocks) on the right of the centre, opened fire upon the attackers.

The Artillery of the Marathas

The Marathas were weaker in the artillery arm than any of their contemporaries - mainly because they depended almost on exclusive purchases from other sources for their cannon. Although Shivaji had a regular department of Topkhana and he was well aware of the effectiveness of artillery, he never had a foundry of his own. He managed to obtain some guns from the foundries at Surat, while others had been captured from the muslim rulers of the south-but by and large his Topkhana was described as a collection of "old and defective' guns palmed off by the European merchant companies which carried on a regular trade in arms and ammunition.

Besides cannons of European manufacture, Shivaji possessed some light pieces of Indian make called Tijala or Zamburak or Shuternal. The furthest he ever went toward ensuring a regular supply of artillery was to allow a French company to build a factory at Rajapore.

In the Peshwa period, some efforts were made by the Marathas to manufacture their own Artillery. Baji Rao started his own foundry. A Cannon ball factory was established at Ambegavan in 1765-66 during the administration of Madhav Rao I and four years later another factory was established at Poona for manufacturing cannons. These factories, however, produced a number of anti quoted guns of a style notoriously crude and clumsy, and the Marathas still steadily looked towards the Europeans for the supply of arms and ammunition.

The guns used by the Marathas in the third battle of Panipat against Abdali's mobile Artillery are described by Kasi Raj Pandit as ''very large and heavy and their level not easily altered, their shot began to pass over our (Abdali's) troops, and fell a mile in the rear." The fire arms used by the gardis who accompanied ParshramBhauPatwardhan on his Mysore expedition are described by Lieutenant Moore to be "as usual defective."

The Artillery of Tipu Sultan

Like all other Indian rulers of the 18th century, Tipu aimed to organise his Army on the western model- based on the predominance of Infantry and Artillery. Primarily an infantry soldier, he relied more on his Artillery than Cavalry- an Arm which he often neglected. The Artillery took an active part in all the battles he fought against the Marathas and the British. To face the British Army, which has highly modernised Artillery, Tippu had to improve the standard of his guns. After the siege of Seringapatam by Lord Cornwallis, Tipu paid greater attention to the casting of better quality guns and also acquired some from France. Guns were cast (both in iron and brass) by his workmen under the supervision of French technicians. Tipu improvised a technique of smelting iron in clay furnaces with bellows of buffalo hide, and hammered it into gun shots. Buchanan says that Tipu had a Frenchman (probably Manoud) in his employ who devised an engine driven by water power for boring cannons. An observer said that the ornamental finishing of the brass guns and mortars had been "brought to some perfection".

The Artillery of the Sikhs

Guru Govind Singh first conceived the idea of forming the Sikhs into a militaristic commonwealth to fight the Moghuls. The earlier Sikh Armies, however , were composed almost entirely of irregular Infantry and horsemen - the famous Misls or the Dal Khalsa. Subsequently, the proportion of horsemen increased considerably- so that at one time the strength of the Misls rose to ten thousand infantry and any where between one to three hundred thousand horsemen.

The Sikh used Artillery for the first time when Banda Bahadur fought the Subedar of Sirhind. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Khan tells us that at Gurdaspur in 1715, the Sikhs had Light Artillery which they had captured from Wazir Khan, the Faujdar of Sirhind. The Department of Artillery was organised into two sections Topkhana Kalan (siege guns) and TopkhanaKhurd (field guns) and was placed under a separate Darogha as early as 1804. TopkhanaJinsi or mixed batteries comprising aspi, gavi and hobath guns and Zambyrjgabair swivel batteries.

Participations in World War II

The Campaigns in Malaya, Burma, East Africa, the Middle East and Italy blooded the Indian Artillery during World War II. Its role in that war, however, was a limited one because its units were employed as a part of the Royal Artillery which was responsible for the provision of Artillery support. The Indian Artillery never really came into its own as a separate identity during that war.

The Indian Artillery's participation in the fighting began in East Africa. As a precautionary measure against the possibility of Italy joining the war on the side of Germany, 22 Mountain Battery was dispatched to Kenya on 1 September 1939- two days before Britain declared war on Germany. This unit thus became the first Indian Artillery unit to see action in the Second World War. Subsequently, when Italy came into the War, this mountain battery was allotted to the East African Brigade which drove back the Italians from the southeast. An Indian State l Force (ISF) Artillery unit, namely, 1 Jammu and Kashmir Battery, also fought against the Italians. 1 J and K and 22 Indian Mountain Batteries were the Indian element of the Artillery in support of the operations which brought about the surrender of the Italians at AmbaAllagi. After its executes at Keren and in Abbyssinia, 1 J & K Battery fought with the French and the Allied Forces which liberated Syria from Vichy France.

Two other Indian Mountain Artillery Units, namely, 27 and 18 Indian Mountain Batteries, went overseas to Aden earmarked for a special role. The Indian Mountain Batteries in the Middle East were regimented under 26 Indian Mountain Regiment in the latter part of 1941. This Regiment returned to India in April 1942 and served thereafter on the North West Frontier of the Indian Artillery units raised during the War, the first to go overseas was a battery of 1 Indian Anti-Tank Regiment. It was rushed to Iraq early in 1941 in support of the force detailed for the quelling of the Rashid Ali rebellion. The remainder of the Regiment moved to Iraq by the end of 1941. In March, 1942, 1 Indian Anti-Tank Regiment formed part of 10 Indian Division. 2 Indian Field Regiment accompanied 6 Indian Division to Persia and Iraq Command (PAIC).

2 Indian Field and 1 Indian Anti-Tank Regiments found themselves in the Desert and took part in the Libyan battles against Rommel, winning distinction at BirHacheim. These two regiments suffered heavy casualties. 1 Indian Anti-Tank Regiment suffered so heavily that it had to be broken up temporarily and reformed later in India. The following account of the action at BirHacheim testified to the gallantry and the professional skill of 2 Indian Field Regiment. On 26 May, 1942, 3 Indian Motor Brigade Group which included 2 Indian Field Regiment, moved to an area south of BirHacheim which was held by a Free French Brigade. At six 'O' clock that by armour in strength early next 6 morning.

The morning of the 27th May confirmed the previous evening's information. German armour equivalent to about two armoured divisions could be seen in harbor 3000 yards from the Indian Motor Brigade's forward defended localities. The Commanding Officer ordered all batteries to engage the German armoured concentration. Their fire scattered the soft vehicles while the German tanks formed up for an attack. The troops of 3 and 7 Field Batteries engaged the tanks at a range of 300 yards and hit some of them with the very first shots. Then the German tanks came up in greater strength. The orders were to fight to the last man and the last round. The forward troops kept fighting the seemingly unending number of tanks. Some German armour came round the flank to attack 4 Battery and the rear troops. The last tank disabled by C Troop 7 Field Battery came to a stop ten yards from No 3 Gun. The gun position officer and a gun detachment commander were killed and the No 1 wounded severely. In 3 Battery gun area, a shell landed in a gun pit in 'B' Troop position and killed three of the detachment. The gun was brought into action quickly and the troop knocked out another 5 tanks. "A" Troop destroyed 7 tanks. This was a good performance by any standards.

The Statesman of 29 August, 1942, published a press note under the heading "Awards for Indian Artillerymen", concerning three of the Distinguished Service Medals won at BirHacheim. Two of them were won by Anti-Tank Detachment Commanders and the other by a Non Commissioned Officer in the Field Regiment. In the first case, the Detachment Commander was moving his gun when the German tanks made a determined attack. " He at once brought his gun into action and hit two tanks. Forced to withdraw to a new position he hit another tank", showing great courage and coolness during the action. The second award was won during a fierce engagement with German tanks. The detachment commander set a fine example before his men, who fought magnificently and knocked out two tanks. The great courage displayed in directing fire against a number of advancing tanks earned the third.IDSM.

The Statesman of 30 August, 1942, notes the award of the DSO to Major PP Kumaramangalam who was in command of 7 Field Battery at BirHacheim. On 2 September 1942, it carried the story of Havildar Manoj Lakshmi Narasu's great courage and devotion to duty which was an inspiration to his men. "During the action, he ignored bursting shells in order to go from gun to gun, encouraging the crews and maintaining morale at a high pitch". At the end of the battle it was found that both the troops officers were missing. Havildar Major Narasu collected the survivors and led them to safety.

The performance of the Indian Artillery was praised by Mr Winston Churchill himself in the floor of the House of Commons of the British Parliament, on the day following the action BirHacheim. Such recognition was not earned without sacrifice. NaikJagannathan who knocked out 8 tanks, was wounded and died while laying his gun. As soon as what was left of 2 Indian Field Regiment could be reassembled and reorganised, the Regiment was back fighting with the various columns trying to resist Rommel's dash to EI Alamein. More casualties were sustained and more taken prisoners-of-war. Among the officers taken prisoner there were four Indian Artillery Officers including Major Kumaramangalam.

At the time of the action at BirHacheim, the Japanese offensive in Burma had taken them to the eastern gates of India, on the Burma-Assam border. Many of the gunner units of the Indian Army Returned to India. 1 Indian Anti Tank Regiment returned from PAIC, 5 (Maratha) Anti-Tank Regiment from the Middle East (with 5 Infantry Division) 2 Indian Field Regiment also returned to India. The only Indian Artillery unit left in the Middle East, was 4 (Maratha) Anti-Tank Regiment. The Maratha anti-tank gunners of this Regiment later took part in every operation of 8 Indian Infantry Division in Italy. They participated in the river crossing operations at Sangro and at Senio. The guns and the jeeps of 4 (Maratha) Anti-Tank Regiment were slung across the river over a steel cable-way erected by the Maratha anti-tank gunners themselves. 4 (Maratha) Anti-Tank Regiment won a DSO, a Military Medal and an IDSM in that operation. Later still, 4 (Maratha) Anti-Tank Regiment functioned also in a mortar role. The support given by the Maratha mortar gunners on the assault on the Gothic Line earned praise from the Divisional Commander.

The Artillery in Malaya

The first Indian Artillery unit to see action in the war against the Japanese was 22 Mountain Regiment, which had sailed from India for Malaya in August, 1939, and was mechanised. On arrival 21 mountain Battery of this Regiment was deployed in support of 8 Infantry Brigade on 6 December, 1941, (in the Kota Baru area) and shelled the Japanese ships within range on the day of the invasion , 8 December. 2 Mountain Regiment fought all down the Peninsula in small detachments. The batteries were employed in a secondary anti-tank role. The men of 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, in particular, did some good work as anti- tank gunners.

1 Indian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment and 1,4 and 5 Indian Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries were deployed on the airfields and at Singapore together with the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) and other Royal Artillery units. The Japanese Air Force kept the anti-aircraft gunners in practice with continuous raids every day. Casualties were suffered but all ranks faced their tasks with courage and coolness. 22 Mountain Regiment and 1 Indian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment were captured in Malaya.

Operations in Burma

After the Japanese war broke out, 17 Indian Infantry Division was ordered to Burma. The HQ Royal Artillery attached to this Division sailed in the same ship. By the time the President Doumer docked at Rangoon, Malaya was being over- run and Singapore was threatened. HQ RA was disembarked and accompanied 17 Indian Infantry Division to Moulmein, where it assumed command of 5 and 12 Indian Mountain Batteries and of the Moulmein garrison. HQ 27 Mountain Regiment, which had arrived in Burma towards the end of 1941, retained command over 23 Mountain Battery. 27 Mountain Regiment less 5 and 12 Mountain Batteries operated under 1 Burma Division.

A section of 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery supported a battalion of the Baluch Regiment at the Paan ferry. A perimeter camp was organized. The battery transport was outside the perimeter of the camp, which was attacked heavily for 48 hours. When the infantry withdrew, two guns had to be left behind but HQ RA Burma Army sent the replacements immediately. In support of 16 Infantry Brigade box, the artillery observation post of 5 Battery was cut off. The battery commander fired a barrage to enable the infantry to link up. 5 and 12 Mountain Batteries supported 17 Infantry Division at the battle of the Sitting.

Operations on the Indo-Burma Border (May 1942 - September 1944)

Back in India, Army formations were hastily rushed up to the Arakan and Imphal fronts to hold the Japanese on the border. In the spring of 1943, an offensive was launched by 14 Division in an attempt to recapture Akyab (in which 23 Mountain Regiment took part). 15 Corps had been raised for the Arakan operations and 14 Corps made responsible for the Imphal front-under Fourteenth Army (General "Bill" Slim). In the Tiddim area, 17 Indian Light Division was in close contact with the Japanese. 21, 28 and 29 Indian Mountain Regiments supported that formation. Bitter fighting took place in the Chin hills particularly in the Kennedy Peak area.

The following Indian Artillery units participated in World War II :-

The Regiment of Artillery constitutes a formidable operational arm of Indian Army. Historically it takes its lineage from Moghul Emperor Babur who is popularly credited with introduction of Artillery in India, in the Battle of Panipat in 1526. However, evidence of earlier use of gun by Bahmani Kings in the Battle of Adoni in 1368 and King Mohammed Shah of Gujrat in fifteenth century have been recorded.

Regiment of Artillery in India was raised on 28 September 1827 with the raising of Bombay Artillery which was later renamed as 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. This day is celebrated by the Regiment of Artillery as the “Gunners Day”. The first Indian War of Independence was sparked off at Meerut on 10 May 1857, primarily by native artillery of Bengal Army. This resulted in total ban on Indian artillery units except mountain artillery batteries till British Government later relented on this order and thus on 15 January 1935, `A’ Field Brigade was formed, which later became 1st Indian Field Regiment.

Battle of BirHacheim

The advent of the First World War gave Indian Artillery an opportunity to show their real mettle. Fighting as far apart as East Africa, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and Palestine, Indian gunners acquitted themselves with rare courage and enterprise. The Second World War saw Indian Gunners in action in East and North Africa,Middle East when Havildar Umrao Singh took on Japanese soldiers with his gun rammer in an effort to save his gun. Individual honours apart, it was the collective valour and dedication of Indian gunners that caused Sir Winston Churchil to rise from his seat in the House of Commons to pay tribute to them for their decisive role in the Battle of BirHachiem against Rommel’s Panzer Army.

By the end of Second World War Indian gunners had won one Victoria Cross, One George Medal, 15 Military Crosses, two IOMs, 22 IDSMs, 18 Military Medals, five OBEs, One MBE, three BEMs, 13 Burma Gallantry Medals and 467 “JangiInams”. In acknowledgement of their contribution Indian Artillery earned the coveted title of `Royal’ in 1945. Indian Artillery during independence consisted of Field, Air Defence, Counter Bombardment, Coastal, Air Observation Post branches and was allotted eighteen and half all types of artillery regiments while remaining nine and half units went to Pakistan.

Jammu & Kashmir Operation (1947 - 48)

Participation of Indian Artillery in Jammu and Kashmir operations during 1947-48 commenced with the first flights of civil and Royal Indian Air Force Dakotas, which transported 1 SIKH Battalion to Srinagar on the morning of 27 October 1947. Personnel of 2 Field Regiment (SP) and 13 Field Regiment donned uniform of 1 SIKH and proceeded as a composite company of the battalion under CaptRLChauhan of13 Field Regiment. It operated as infantry till first week of November1947 when four 3.7 inch howitzer reached the area. Thereafter they took over the guns and assisted the infantry to drive out the infiltrators along Srinagar - Baramula road. Later artillery proved to be battle winning factor in defence of Srinagar airfield and subsequent route of Pakistani tribesmen in Jammu region and Kashmir Valley. Artillery played a dominant role in recapture of Poonch, Rajauri,Thangdar,Tithwal, Dras and Kargil during 1947-48.

Battle of Poongli Bridge

The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War was more challenging for the Regiment of Artillery than ever before. It was for the first time that Indian Army was fighting full fledged war on two fronts. In the Eastern Sector, artillery had to improvise extensively to get guns ammunition and vehicles across various major and minor rivers. It ensured that not once did infantry or armour had to look over their shoulders for artillery support.

During these operations Para Field Battery took part in para drop with Para Battalion to capture Pongli bridge on Lohaganj river near Tangail which expedited surrender by Pakistani Army in East Pakistan. Para was first to enter Dacca around 11.30 AM on 16 December 71 followed by Light Battery. Soon 563 Mountain Battery also entered Dacca. With this a new nation was born. In the Western sector artillery played major role in capture of important Pakistani piquets in Ladakh, Kashmir, Rajauri, Jammu, Punjab and Rajasthan. It was also instrumental in defeating Pakistani designs to capture large Indian territories in the Western Sector.

Tiger Hill

Battlefield Kargil was a challenge for the Regiment of Artillery of dimensions unknown. Critical was the situation for Indian Army and the Nation. What was needed was exacting- the enemy had to be dislodged from its defenses in high mountains and destroyed, so that infantry could launch its fury and regain our territory. It was then that the Regiment of Artillery was called up to deliver, and with this the unique saga in the history of mass employment of artillery in high mountains emerged, a watershed in military warfare.

Tryst of Gunners in unconventional operations commenced with its employment to control violent insurgency movement in the North-East Indian states in the infantry role. Gradually the artillery got to be used extensively in an infantry role in counter insurgency operations in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Assam, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere. What started as subunit level employment developed into regimental and brigade level employment. Gunners have performed exceedingly well in Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles units also. Effectiveness of artillery units in counter insurgency tasks has been well accepted and recognized. Twelve units have been awarded the prestigious Chief Of The Army Staff unit citation and twenty units have been awarded the GOC-In-C Unit Appreciation. Many more units have achieved commendable results.

Artillery units have undertaken large number of diverse tasks like flood and earthquake relief, rescue operations, assisting in building schools and sheds in inaccessible areas, road opening tasks in militant ridden territories, organizing public awareness campaigns and ex- servicemen rally from time to time. It definitely goes to the credit of the gunners that they undertook such diverse commitments in their stride with élan despite being fully involved in their primary tasks.

The Regiment of Artillery initially consisted of the Coastal Artillery , the Air Observation post and Air Defence Artillery branches however due to expansion and ever increasing commitments, these branches bifurcated and became fully operational arms of their own . The Coastal Artillery merged with the Indian Navy in 1964, the Air Observation Post bifurcated in 1986 and renamed Army Aviation, and the Air Defence branch bifurcated and became the Corps of Army Air Defence in 1994.